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Abstract 
 Over the past three decades, Europe has witnessed a growing trend of devolution, or the 
transfer of power from states to their regions. Much of the previous scholarship has examined the 
causes of initial devolution, and found that the creation of regional institutions is linked to unique 
regional identities. This thesis examines whether these identities still matters to voters when 
making decisions about further devolution. Working from the premise that voters can assess the 
material utility of devolution after regional governments have been established, and that voters 
will weigh considerations of material utility more strongly than assessments of expressive utility 
(identity), this thesis tests whether voters’ policy and affective satisfaction with regional 
government displaces identity as the determining factor of support for further devolution. This 
study uses polling data from two European case studies, Wales and Catalonia, and finds that 
while satisfaction does displace identity in both cases, the nature and meaning of identity affects 
its role in voters decision-making. 
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I. Introduction 
 
In the days leading up to a March 2011 referendum on devolution, voters in Wales were 
treated to the rare sight of a flying pig. True Wales, the lead anti-devolution group, paraded a 
large, inflatable swine around the streets of Cardiff with the words “VOTE NO TO MORE 
TAXES AND POLITICIANS” prominently emblazoned on the pig’s side (and a more blunt 
message on the pig’s rear). “Porkie,” as the pig was affectionately known, symbolized the Welsh 
politicians whom anti-devolution campaigners believed had failed to live up to the promises of 
devolution from a decade before.1 Their arguments, however, were very different from the 
nationalism-based opposition of the Just Say No campaign in the 1997 referendum that initiated 
devolution to Wales.2 
 True Wales was not alone in distancing itself from nationalist arguments about 
devolution. Yes for Wales, leading the charge in favor of more devolution, argued that the 
referendum would improve the ability of the legislature to work for the interests of Wales. First 
Minister Carwyn Jones, a Yes for Wales supporter, said, "We can't afford to have a government 
in the slow lane in Wales… if people want the Assembly to be doing more rather than talking 
about doing more, vote yes” (Chorley 2011). The decision by both campaigns to focus on the 
performance of the Welsh government suggested that identity politics had been replaced in the 
Welsh devolution debate. Campaigners appealed to voters’ assessments of devolved government 
on the economy, health care, and education to convince the Welsh people that they were better 
off with (or without) further devolution.  
                                                
1 No campaigner Nigel Bull said that the Assembly “hasn't served the people of Wales well… I feel that Wales has 
gone backwards during those 12 years and we have not seen the benefit we all hoped for” (BBC 2011). 
2 Viscount Tonypandy, the head of that effort, notably said that a “Welsh assembly will fan the flames of 
nationalism. When I was Secretary of State for Wales, my office was blown up by extremists who opposed the 
installation of Charles, Prince of Wales” (Osmond 1997). 
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 Recognizing that the discourse of electorally motivated political elites is driven by voters’ 
attitudes, this thesis seeks to understand if policy-focused arguments are more important than 
identity issues for voters. It does so by examining how well the performance of regional 
government explains voter support for further devolution. Does successful governance at the 
regional level lead to greater support for further devolution? If so, do policy (e.g. economic) 
and/or affective (e.g. trust) measures of support explain voter preferences? This thesis will also 
ask whether these performance assessments have displaced identity as the core determinants of 
voter positions on devolution. 
 This thesis reflects the changing nature of devolution in Europe. Over the past thirty 
years, regional institutions have been established in countries such as the UK, Belgium, Italy, 
and Spain, and as these bodies mature, they have more opportunities to shape voter preferences. 
Whereas past scholarship on devolution has focused on the causes of initial devolution, this 
maturation of regional governments has opened opportunities to examine electoral trends as a 
function of regional policy. Looking at voter assessments of regional government is a far more 
accurate measure of the perceived benefit of devolution than region-level analysis of, for 
example, economic imbalances between the center and periphery. What is less certain is whether 
the influence of identity on these preferences has been displaced. 
 Using case studies of Wales and Catalonia, this thesis will examine regional polling data 
from the past decade to test three hypotheses. 
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H1: Policy satisfaction with regional government in devolved policy areas will lead to 
greater voter support for further devolution. 
I expect voters who are satisfied with the performance of regional government policies 
to want more policymaking from those institutions in the expectation of future 
improvements, and thus support further devolution. 
 
H2: Affective support for regional institutions will lead to greater voter support for 
further devolution. 
 Voters may develop positive impressions of regional government for non-policy 
reasons, such as a belief that regional institutions are representative, that policies are 
responsive to public needs, or that public officials are trustworthy. I expect voters with 
positive impressions of regional government to view these institutions as legitimate 
sources of public policy, and therefore support further devolution. 
 
H3: Voters’ regional identity will be displaced by assessments of regional government 
in determining voter support for further devolution. 
 As regional institutions exercise their devolved powers, voters will be able to assess the 
real impact of devolution. This reduces voter reliance on non-consequentialist 
reasoning (i.e. devolution is intrinsically valuable because I am Welsh) and emphasizes 
the self-interest of the voter (Kay 2003). I expect voters to place more interest in the 
material utility of devolution, displacing identity in determining support for further 
devolution. 
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The remainder of this thesis will be organized as follows. The next section will outline 
the previous scholarship on devolution, focusing on the causes of devolution and the 
determinants of voter support for initial secessionism. I argue that although regional interest may 
provide supplementary justification for devolution, electoral motivations are the primary drivers 
of devolution in Europe. Studies that examine voter attitudes at the regional level have found that 
in addition to national identity, a host of other factors including government performance affect 
voter support for autonomy. The contribution of this thesis is to measure the impact of 
performance assessments on support for further devolution comparatively across regions. 
 In the third section, I will outline the theory of this thesis. I borrow two assumptions from 
the classic Downsian voter model: that voters are rational and that they will vote for the option 
most spatially proximate to their preferences. However, it may be difficult for voters to develop 
preferences for devolution because the material utility of major institutional change is unknown. 
Each of the hypotheses are shown to operationalize a measure of material utility which exists 
after regional institutions have been established. Voter decisions about further devolution should 
therefore operate within the Downsian framework.   
 The fourth and fifth sections will examine the cases of devolution in Wales and Catalonia 
to test the theory presented in the previous section. While the results in Wales strongly suggest 
that satisfaction with regional government and affective support for devolved institutions are 
associated with support for further devolution, these results are not replicated in Catalonia. 
However, both case studies find that as satisfaction with government performance increases, the 
explanatory power of identity decreases, which supports the third hypothesis.  
 I conclude in the sixth section that voters are considering material utility in developing 
positions on further devolution, though the impact of these considerations varies between 
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regions. The historical development of the regional identity has a substantial role in determining 
the relative importance of material and expressive utility to voters, and scholars must examine 
the nature of identity in order to fully understand voters’ decisions. Despite the limitations of this 
study, the results do show a fundamental difference in the way voters assess initial and further 
devolution, and further work in this area may have important scholarly and policy implications. 
II. Literature Review 
 
The existing literature on regions focuses on two general causes of devolution: regional 
characteristics in which the region as a whole is the unit of analysis, and electorally-driven 
processes in which voters are the primary actors. This section will outline the key texts in each of 
these schools of thought, including the cultural, geopolitical, and economic region-level 
arguments and the voter-level analysis upon which this thesis is based. While region-level 
reasoning may provide supplementary justification for devolution, the electoral aims of political 
elites offers a more compelling case as the primary cause of devolution. 
 A unique regional identity is widely viewed as a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
devolution. Regional elites can use cultural and historical narratives to create a regional identity 
(see, for example, Syssner 2009). Some studies consider identity as an independent variable in a 
broader analysis (e.g. Sorens 2005), but Urwin (1982) points out that cultural factors offer only a 
potential for territorial mobilization, not a guarantee. Other scholars have suggested that 
European integration fosters regionalism. Hooghe (1996) argues that EU cohesion policy 
provides a forum for subnational authorities to challenge national authorities. Dardanelli (2005a, 
2005b) is the most fervent advocate of this school of thought, suggesting that the positive result 
in the 1997 Scottish devolution referendum was “almost exclusively” the result of the 
Europeanization of regional politics. 
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Economic arguments for devolution credit both globalization and disparities between 
regions and states for fostering devolution. Scott (1998) argues that globalization is creating 
regional trade relationships that dominate international markets, and Ohmae (1995) contends that 
regions “are the right size and scale to be the true, natural business units” in a global economy. 
However, van Houten (2003) and Sorens (2004) suggest that while globalization may reinforce 
previous autonomy demands, there is less evidence linking globalization with an overall increase 
in devolution after accounting for other economic, political, and cultural factors. Economists also 
widely agree that disparities between regions and states can lead to secessionism (Bookman 
1993; Bolton and Roland 1997), but most scholars believe that economically successful regions 
are more likely to secede (Treisman 1997; Dion 1996). 
Although region-level analysis may offer supplementary justification for devolution, 
political explanations get the most traction. Keating’s (1998) seminal work argues that “new 
regionalism” emerged as a result of modern mass politics, which “accentuated the importance of 
space” and caused parties to adopt regional platforms to maximize electoral success. From the 
late 1980s, the creation of new political forums for regional actors and organized movements 
encouraged devolution. Although these factors were joined by other cultural institutional 
considerations, “the phenomenon is too diverse and conditioned by local circumstances” not to 
be driven by politics. Applying Keating’s model, Sorens (2009) argues that electoral politics are 
the primary drivers of devolution, and that state-level parties will support regional autonomy 
only when it will enhance their political power. Hopkin (2003) further finds that when national 
party leaders support decentralizing reforms, they do so in order to pass the buck for difficult 
policy problems or for electoral gain. 
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Recognizing the electoral logic of devolution, several scholars have examined what 
motivates regional voter attitudes. The effect of national and regional identity has been heavily 
investigated. Henderson (2007) uses Scottish and Quebecois voters’ identity hierarchies3 to 
measure the effect of national attachment on various political attitudes, such as cynicism, respect 
for political and civic institutions, and participation in democracy. Support for sovereignty is 
considered, but only in Quebec. Henderson finds that those most attached to Quebec are most 
likely to support sovereignty, and that only those who feel no attachment to Quebec believe that 
the national government best protects their interests. However, she writes that “identity groups 
possess dissimilar views on identity issues such as sovereignty and they may possess different 
views of the state, but… when we control for other factors, differences disappear.” Fitjar (2010) 
uses four Eurobarometer surveys that ask about attachment towards the respondent’s region and 
state to construct a “Moreno index”. Using regional attachment as a measure of support for 
devolution,4 Fitjar measures the power of various cultural and economic factors to explain 
voters’ regionalism. Although he finds that a number of factors affect regional attachment, his 
dependent variable precludes measuring the effect of identity on support for devolution. 
Two studies have examined support for secessionism in particular. Sorens (2005) predicts 
vote shares for secessionist parties in regional and national elections (not limited to Europe), and 
concludes that while identity may have an impact on support for secession, “the prospective 
costs and benefits of independence, along with institutional constraints on voting for secessionist 
parties, make a difference.” Anderson (2001) uses responses about identity, civic and religious 
                                                
3 For Scotland, data is from the British Election Study, which uses a standard 5-point Moreno question. For Quebec, 
data is from the Canadian Election Study, which uses a 0-to-100 thermometer scale to ask respondents about their 
Canadian and Quebecois identities. Henderson derives a 5-point Moreno scale from these thermometer responses. 
4 Fitjar argues that “when the people of a region regard the statewide demos as inappropriate for deciding over a 
policy area that affects the region, they will want to redefine the demos in order to make it congruent with the 
regional public.” 
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factors, and nationalist attitudes from the 1999 Welsh Assembly Election Study and the 1999 
Scottish Parliament Election Study to analyze the sources of nationalist sentiment. He finds that 
older generations are less likely to support independence, while working class people are more 
likely to do so. In addition, practicing members of the established church tend to be less 
supportive of independence. He concludes that although national identity has the most important 
influence on support for independence, other factors affect attitudes towards secession as well. 
Unlike previous studies, this thesis will use evaluations of the performance of regional 
government to explain support for independence. Putnam’s (1993) famous study, Making 
Democracy Work, measures the effectiveness of Italian regional governments based on twelve 
indicators such as legislative innovation, local health unit spending, and bureaucratic 
responsiveness. However, unlike this thesis, Putnam uses these measures as dependent rather 
than independent variables. Pattie and Johnston (1995) argue that there is a “regional sociotropic 
vote,” or electoral decisions by voters based on regional economic performance. Their study also 
finds that region plays a statistically significant role in voting in national elections, even 
accounting for class, personal economic performance, and regional economic performance. This 
challenges Rose and McAllister (1990) and McAllister and Studlar (1992), who argue that any 
supposed regional effects reflect the concentrating of similar individuals in a geographic space – 
the so-called “neighborhood effect” (Cox 1969; Johnston 1979; Taylor and Gudgin 1979). 
Studies of how voters translate their assessments of regional government into positions 
on devolution are limited. Bromley and Curtice (2003) find that decreasing political trust among 
Scottish voters was correlated with increasing “disillusion” with devolution, although they do not 
draw a causal link between these two measures. Bond and Rosie (2010) conduct the only 
comparative post-devolution study of constitutional attitudes to date, and find that national 
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identity is a significant predictor of support for further devolution in Scotland, Wales, and 
Northern Ireland, but not in England. However, they also consider only party, linguistic status, 
and social class, the same variables often used in pre-devolution studies. Wyn Jones and Scully 
(2012) are the first to test whether assessments of regional government affect support for further 
devolution. Using the 2011 Welsh Referendum Study, they find that the performance of the 
regional government had a statistically significant impact on a respondent’s vote in the 
referendum. They also find that identity did not reach statistical significance as a predictor of the 
respondent’s vote. 
While Wyn Jones and Scully’s innovative study includes performance as an explanatory 
factor, their dependent variable is the respondent’s vote in the referendum rather than her 
constitutional attitudes. Although they find a strong correlation between these measures, their 
dependent variable is not comparable across regions, and comparative studies of post-devolution 
attitudes that consider the role of government performance in constitutional preferences have not 
yet been conducted. This thesis applies Wyn Jones and Scully’s methodology comparatively 
across two European regions and fills this gap in the literature.  
III. Theory 
 
For more than a decade, political commentators have recognized a growing movement of 
devolution in Europe, epitomized by The Economist’s observation in 1997 that “if there is a turn-
of-the-century message in Europe, it may be ‘devolve or die’.” Political scientists have attempted 
to explain these developments using both macro- and micro-level theories of the causes of 
devolution. This thesis hopes to add another dimension to our understanding of the devolution 
trend in Europe. In this section, I will outline the theory of my research, beginning with the 
Downsian model of voting. Next, I will discuss consequential versus deontological justifications 
 10 
for devolution, which make up the core theoretical question of this thesis. I will then apply these 
theoretical foundations to each of the three hypotheses.  
 This thesis rests on the rational choice model of voting5, elaborated in detail by Anthony 
Downs (1957). Two key assumptions have been borrowed from this model: that voters are 
rational actors and that they will vote for the option that is most spatially proximate to their 
preferences (the spatial model of voting). I will address both of these assumptions in turn. The 
first, that voters are rational actors, has been debated in both political science and economics. 
George Tullock’s seminal work The Vote Motive (1976) was one of the first defenses of the 
rational voter, and later work by Chong (1996), Fiorina (1997), and Edlin, et al. (2007) support 
his findings. Although challenged by Aldrich (1993) who suggests that in low-cost, low-benefit 
situations the rational choice model is not very predictive, Tversky and Kahneman (1981, 1986) 
who show that the framing of a decision can affect the outcome, and Hindmoor (2006) concludes 
“that voters are becoming more Downsian in their behavior.”6 
The second assumption from the Downsian model is that voters will select the option 
most spatially proximate to their preferences. Spatial voting presumes that voter preferences and 
electoral options can be arranged on a one-dimensional plane, in this case spanning from no 
autonomy to full independence, and that voters will select the electoral option which is closest to 
their preference. Despite the spatial model being challenged on some specific details (see Green 
and Shapiro 1994), Merrill and Grofman (1999) review the literature and find that voters are 
substantially more likely to vote for the party closest to their preferences.7 Although scholars do 
not universally accept the spatial model of voting, the assumptions used in this thesis appear to 
                                                
5 For an excellent summary of the rational choice school in political science, see Green (2002). 
6 Hindmoor acknowledges that the relationship between policy position and the actual vote is probabilistic rather 
than deterministic, mirroring the defense of rational choice theory made by Friedman (1996). 
7 Caplan (2007) suggests that voters may have preferences which violate their rational interest. 
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be reasonably defended. 
Downs assumes that voter preferences reflect assessments of material utility. However, 
when making decisions about devolution, voters may be unable to measure economic benefit. In 
an under-acknowledged contribution, Adrian Kay (2003) argues that the difficulties voters face 
in predicting the long-term effects of major institutional change render “consequentialist” 
reasoning, or the belief that devolution will have desirable effects, invalid. He suggests three 
reasons for these difficulties: 
1. Regional governments share some concurrent powers with the national government, 
2. Devolution may “liberate” latent desire for even more autonomy, and 
3. It is difficult to attach probabilities to the success of reforms. 
As a result, “there is no rationality in a public decision to initiate a massive and protracted reform 
of uncertain efficacy, unless that reform was perceived to be intrinsically valuable.” Kay 
contends that support for devolution is instead driven by “deontological” justifications, or the 
idea that devolution is inherently valuable. Extending Kay’s work, each of the hypotheses in this 
thesis attempt to uncover the “consequential” support for devolution that should exist after 
regional institutions have been established and voters can assess the efficacy of further reform.8 
 The first hypothesis suggests that if a voter is satisfied with the performance of devolved 
institutions, then they should expect further devolutionary reforms to have a high probability of 
success as well. The actual performance of regional institutions is immaterial – as Hetherington 
(2005) writes, “the perception of government performance is more important than the reality.”9 
                                                
8 Popkin (1994) and Lupia and McCubbins (1998) argue that voters use information, or signals, from past events to 
make political decisions. 
9 Voter perceptions of government services seem to be fairly accurate. For example, Chingos, et al. (2010) find that 
citizen evaluations of school performance largely reflect publicly available information about student achievement, 
particularly among those actively engaged with education (i.e. have children in school). See Yang and Holzer (2006) 
for a summary of literature on citizen perceptions of government performance. 
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A potential criticism of this hypothesis is that regional parties which oppose further devolution 
may hamstring government services to discourage voters from expecting future reform success. 
However, Eve Hepburn (2008, 2009) suggests the opposite - as “stateless nationalist and regional 
parties (SNRPs)” gain political power, regional branches of national parties have been forced to 
adopt stronger constitutional claims.10 Regional branch parties will attempt to prevent SNRPs 
from “owning” center-periphery issues, and the electoral motivations of political parties result in 
more pro-devolutionary positions. Indeed, Anwen (2009) notes: 
One of the great successes of nationalist mobilization in Wales and Galicia is that 
they have succeeded in changing the parameters of debate within regional 
political arenas. In particular, nationalist and regionalist parties have… pushed 
state-wide political parties into committing themselves to grant more authority to 
national territories within the state. (553) 
 The importance of Anwen’s argument to this thesis is that regional branch parties, which are 
rarely able to appeal to deontological justifications for devolution as effectively as SNRPs, will 
instead appeal to voters’ consequentialist logic in defending their pro-devolution positions. 
 The second hypothesis contends that affective support for regional institutions will lead 
to greater support for further devolution. This thesis examines two measures of affective support: 
trust in regional government and the belief that regional government is representative. We will 
begin with the first measure, trust. David Easton (1965), in his seminal work A Systems Analysis 
of Political Life, argues that trust is derived from both support for specific political actors and 
support for political institutions or types of governance.11 This thesis is primarily concerned with 
the latter, and work by Scholz and Lubbell (1998) and Scholz and Pinney (1995) find that 
                                                
10 Detterbeck and Hepburn (2010) find that this effect is particularly strong among center-left parties. 
11 I am indebted to fellow honors student Devin Braun for his assistance with this section. 
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experiences with government agencies and services, especially negative interactions (Kampen, et 
al. 2006), can impact a citizen's trust in government. Yang and Holzer (2006) further suggest that 
“evaluations of government are affected by many other factors, such as partisanship, media, 
postmodern culture, and irrationality,” though they argue that perceptions of government 
performance play a primary role in determining trust in government. 
 We must address the link between government performance and trust proposed by Yang 
and Holzer as well as others (for a summary, see Bouckaert, et al. 2002). If trust is linked to 
evaluations of government performance, then measures of trust are merely a proxy for 
performance rather than an independent factor which a voter could consider in forming 
devolution preferences. However, there is evidence to suggest that the link between performance 
and trust may not be absolute. Van de Walle and Bouckaert (2003) challenge the causal 
relationship between performance and trust, since other factors (i.e. citizen-citizen interactions) 
may have an effect. Huseby (2000) finds that individuals react to the same level of performance 
in different ways, and Yang and Holzer note that perceptions of performance are subject to 
political discourse and framing. Bouckaert and Van de Walle (2003) argue that these perceptions 
also reflect a citizen's sympathy with the mission of a government service, and Van de Walle, et 
al. (2005) posit that the relationship between trust and satisfaction may be the result of general 
attitudes towards government. Clearly, trust is related to factors other than performance, even if 
performance is a consideration. 
 Having established that we can operationalize trust as an independent determinant of 
voter decisions, we must now examine whether trust has an effect on support for further 
devolution. Several studies conducted in the American context have found that devolution is 
correlated with a decline in trust with higher levels of government. For example, Jennings (1998) 
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argues that higher relative trust in the local level compared to the federal level is the driving 
force behind devolution, and that in practice, this reflects absolute reductions in federal 
government trust. In addition, Hetherington and Nugent (2001) state that “decreasing trust in the 
dominant level of government does lead to increased confidence in others,” and that local 
government capacity has little influence on demands for devolution compared to symbolic 
factors such as trust. The proposition of H2, that trust will have a positive effect on support for 
further devolution, seems reasonable. 
 To understand the second measure of affective support, we must look to the public 
administration literature, which has explored representativeness at length. The theory of 
representative bureaucracy12 suggests that organizations will be more responsive to the public if 
they reflect the demographic make-up of the populations they serve (Mosher 1982). Thielmann 
and Stewart (1996), by examining government services accessed by AIDS patients, argue that 
citizens value demographic representativeness in public agencies, which contributes to 
governmental legitimacy. As a result, Andrews, et al. (2005) argue that “public perceptions of 
government performance will improve as bureaucracies become more representative,” and 
Meier, et al. (2001) and Meier, Wrinkle, and Polinard (1999) propose that representative 
bureaucracies may deliver better objective performance. Like trust, there appears to be a link 
between representativeness and government performance. 
 However, once again there are mediating factors in this relationship. The New Public 
Management school promotes the importance of management on organization performance, 
culture, and managerial quality (see Andrews, et al. 2005). In a study of nine federal agencies, 
Hennessey (1998) concludes that leadership has an impact on organizational performance, and 
Ingraham, Joyce, and Donahue (2003) argue that effective management is the most important 
                                                
12 See Meier (1993) for an extensive review of representative bureaucracy theory and research. 
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determinant of government performance. Cox and Blake (1991) find that organizations must 
leverage their cultural and ethnic diversity to obtain benefits such as increased creativity and 
problem solving, and Keiser, et al. (2002) argue that public agencies must turn “passive” 
representation of women into “active” policy influence to realize the benefits of diversity. 
 Clearly, factors other than demographic representation affect government performance, 
which allows us to operationalize representativeness as an independent variable in our analysis 
even if it plays a part in performance. Moreover, the causal relationship of H2, that 
representativeness will have a positive relationship with support for further devolution, finds 
support in the literature. Aarts and Thomassen (2006) use data from the Comparative Study of 
Electoral Systems in 28 cases to assess the relationship between representativeness and 
satisfaction with democracy. They find that perceived representativeness of the legislature has a 
positive relationship with satisfaction with democracy, which when applied to the signaling 
theory proposed by Popkin (1994) and Lupia and McCubbins (1998), suggests that as voters 
perceive regional governments to be more representative, they will be more likely to support 
further devolution. 
 The third hypothesis speaks to the conflict introduced by Kay (2003) between low 
information and assessments of material utility inherent to voter decisions about devolution. H3 
suggests that after regional institutions have been established and voters have assessed the 
impact on their own material well being, these assessments will displace identity as the 
determinants of voter preferences on devolution. The literature on expressive voting offers 
support for this hypothesis.13 Horowitz (1985) argues that given low information about the 
consequences of an electoral outcome, voters will use ethnic identity as a proxy to assess which 
                                                
13 The literature on expressive voting explores both why citizens choose to vote and whom they choose to vote for. 
This section draws almost exclusively on literature that focuses on the latter. For an excellent summary of 
expressive voting, see Hamlin and Jennings (2011). 
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candidate will offer better access to public resources. Horowitz applies this type of expressive 
voting primarily to developing African countries, where ethnic patronage by elected officials can 
affect the distribution of public goods, but his model can be used whenever information on 
material utility is low. 
 Brennan and Hamlin (1998) consider whether expressive voting is mutually exclusive 
from instrumental, or economic, considerations. The argue that “an individual citizen’s 
expressive concerns might mesh perfectly with her instrumental interests,” and when citizens 
vote on expressive grounds, they are still within the spatial model of voting by selecting the 
candidate with whom they most closely identify. Hillman (2010) formally develops this model, 
which can be simplified to the equation Total Utility = Material Utility + Expressive Utility. In 
Hillman’s model, when a voter is unable to assess material utility, then expressive utility 
becomes the only consideration. However, Hillman’s simplified model14 does not consider the 
relative weight of material and expressive utility in a voter’s total utility calculation. 
 Fortunately, studies of expressive voting offer some clues to the relative weight of 
material and expressive utility when both are present. Gutierrez-Romero (2010) examines survey 
data from the 2007 Kenyan elections and finds that certain economic factors weaken the salience 
of ethnic identity for voters, but that this effect is small. Bassi, Morton and Williams (2011) 
conduct an experiment in which participants were assigned a group identity and then given a 
financial incentive to vote against their group. They find that without these incentives, 
participants are more likely to vote with their group, suggesting that even “minimally assigned 
group identities” affect voter decision making in the absence of information about material 
utility. However, when financial incentives to vote against the group exist, the role of identity in 
voting decisions (and thus the relative importance of expressive utility) falls dramatically. This 
                                                
14 Hillman does present a more complex formal model that accounts for some of the nuances of voting. 
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mirrors the relationship proposed by H3, that when voters are able to assess the material utility of 
further devolution, the importance of identity will decrease. 
IV. Case Study – Wales 
 
Wales provides perhaps the best natural experiment for this thesis. When devolution 
occurred in 1999, the National Assembly for Wales had very limited powers compared to its 
Scottish counterpart, the result of a compromise in the Labour party that left substantial room for 
more regional powers. Indeed, Ron Davies’15 famous remark that “devolution is a process, not an 
event” has frequently been used by pro-devolution activists. In addition, the National Assembly 
has seen a steady increase in its policy “competencies”, or areas of primary authority. In 2011, 
voters in Wales decided on a referendum to significantly increase the powers of the National 
Assembly while still stopping well short of full autonomy. The public debate surrounding this 
referendum should also have sharpened voters’ opinions on further devolution. 
 This section will be divided into four parts. First, I will briefly outline the history of 
devolution in Wales and frame the context of the data. Second, I will describe the data being 
used for this case study, and in the third part, I will provide the results of the analyses conducted 
for the Welsh case. Fourth, I will analyze the data in light of the hypotheses of this thesis. 
 Devolution in Wales traces its antecedents to the establishment of the Welsh Office in 
1965, which was responsible for economic planning, housing, local government, and cultural 
issues. Over the next three decades, the responsibilities of the Welsh Office expanded to include 
other policy areas. However, the Welsh Office had no primary policymaking powers, and was 
responsible only for executing decisions handed down from London. In 1979, Jim Callaghan’s 
Labour government pushed forward on an election commitment to hold a referendum to establish 
                                                
15 Ron Davies was Secretary of State for Wales from 1997-1998 and is considered by many to be the chief architect 
of devolution in Wales. 
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a Welsh Assembly. However, the referendum received support from only 12% of Welsh voters. 
The defeat halted any talks of an elected Welsh government until the Labour Party won the 1997 
UK general election. One week after a successful Scottish referendum on devolution, and with a 
well-organized “Yes for Wales” campaign supporting the referendum, a referendum to initiate 
devolution in Wales passed with 50.3% of the vote. 
 The new National Assembly for Wales was a weak institution that only had powers over 
secondary legislation,16 and the “need to revisit legislative procedure was clearly signaled from 
the outset of the Assembly” (Rawlings 2005). Following the report of the government-sanctioned 
Richard Commission and a Labour election promise to enhance the legislative powers of the 
Assembly, the Government of Wales Act of 2006 was passed and primary lawmaking authority 
was devolved to the Assembly in specific “matters” of 20 “fields” – for example, measures could 
be passed on energy, but not “transmitting, distributing, or supplying electricity.” The Assembly 
could, through a clumsy process known as a Legislative Competency Order (LCO), negotiate the 
transfer of additional powers from Westminster. In March 2011, a referendum was held to fully 
devolve policymaking in all 20 fields17 to the Assembly, which 63.5% of voters approved. 
This case study will use data from the 2011 Welsh Pre-Referendum Study (WRS), 
conducted ahead of the March referendum.18 The 2011 WRS was conducted of a representative 
sample of 3029 members of the Welsh electorate using an internet survey. This study was 
selected over the post-referendum, pre-election, and post-election studies because the positive 
outcome of the 2011 referendum significantly changed the nature of devolution in Wales, but 
                                                
16 In the United Kingdom, primary legislation is that which creates or modifies a policy. Secondary legislation 
establishes the specific statues and regulations that govern the implementation of primary legislation. 
17 A list of the devolved subject areas can be found on the National Assembly’s website at 
http://www.assemblywales.org/bus-home/bus-third-assembly/bus-legislation-third-assembly/bus-legislation-
guidance-third-assembly/bus-legislation-guidance-documents-third-assembly/legislation_fields/schedule-7.htm. 
18 Special thanks to Dr. Roger Scully at Aberystwyth University and Dr. Richard Wyn Jones at Cardiff University 
for supplying the 2011 Welsh Pre-Referendum Study data ahead of its public release. 
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there was not enough time for the Assembly’s increased powers to affect policymaking. 
Therefore, for the purposes of this thesis, the inability of voters to assess regional government in 
the context of its new powers makes those studies less valuable. 
The most important question asked by the 2011 WRS is a measure of the respondent’s 
support for further devolution.19 Although voters’ opinions on the extent of further devolution 
(i.e. tax-varying powers vs. outright independence) may differ, I treat support for further 
devolution, known as SUPDEV, as a binary variable.20 
Satisfaction with the performance of regional government, known as SATIS, is a factor 
analysis of three questions relating to policy outputs from the Welsh Assembly. Factor analysis 
identifies the underlying characteristics of two or more variables to create a relative measure of 
how much respondents reflect each characteristic. Respondents were asked to assess the National 
Health Service, education standards, and living standards since the formation of the National 
Assembly for Wales.21 After conducting the factor analysis, I divided the respondents into four 
quartiles of satisfaction. I expect that satisfaction will have a positive relationship with support 
for further devolution. 
Affective measures of support for regional government were also included. The first of 
these variables, TRUST, measures respondents’ relative level of trust of Welsh Assembly 
Government (the executive body of the National Assembly for Wales) and the UK government. I 
expect that as voters’ relative trust of the Welsh government increases, they will be more likely 
                                                
19 Full question texts from the 2011 WRS can be found in Appendix B.  
20 The grouping of positions in this way does not appear to have impacted the results. An OLS regression using an 
ordinal scale of status quo, more devolution, and independence (ordered logit was not possible due to the nature of 
the data) is presented in Appendix A, and shows no substantive difference from the binary measure. Also, 
respondents preferring either no devolution or less devolution made up less than 20% of the sample (including just 
3.4% for less devolution), and the decision to group them with respondents selecting the status quo reflects the 
political discourse in Wales, in which less devolution is rarely discussed as a possibility compared to maintaining 
the status quo. 
21 A principle-components factor analysis (varimax rotation) loaded on one factor, and the factor loadings were .872 
for HEALTH, .851 for EDUC, and .868 for LIVING. 
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to support further devolution. The second variable, REPRN, measures how representative the 
voter believes the National Assembly for Wales to be. As with TRUST, I expect that as voters 
believe that the National Assembly for Wales is more representative of ordinary people, they will 
be more likely to support further devolution. 
 A measure of identity, IDENT, uses respondents’ answers to a standard five-point 
Moreno question on Welsh and British identity.22 I expect that as respondents’ identification with 
Wales increases, they will be more likely to support further devolution. However, in line with 
H3, I also expect the effect of identity to be less predictive than measures of policy and affective 
satisfaction with regional government. 
 Several control variables were used, including support for the governing coalition 
(PARTY)23, age (AGE), gender (GENDER), and annual gross household income (INCOME). A 
summary of the variables and their expected relationship to SUPDEV is as follows below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
22 My colleague Alena Stern rightly identified the possibility of an endogeneity effect between satisfaction and 
identity. When an individual is satisfied with regional government, they may claim the regional identity more 
strongly as a result. Although not addressing the endogeneity question directly, a Pearson’s correlation test found 
weak correlations between the satisfaction indicators and identity. The correlation coefficient between IDENT and 
SATIS was .251; and TRUST was .304; and REPRN was .237 (all statistically significant to the p < .01 level). 
23 Respondents were asked to rate each of the six major parties (Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrat, Plaid 
Cymru, UKIP, and BNP) on a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 being “strongly dislike” and 10 being “strongly like.” If a 
respondent rated one or both governing parties (Labour and Plaid Cymru) higher than all others, that party was 
considered to be their party affiliation. If a non-governing party shared the highest rating, that respondent was 
removed from the data set. 
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Table 4.1: Summary of Variables and Expected Signs 
Variable Variable Name Expected Sign 
Satisfaction with regional 
government performance 
(by quartile) 
SATIS + 
Relative trust of Welsh 
Government TRUST + 
Representativeness of 
National Assembly REPRN + 
Identity (Moreno scale) IDENT + 
 
Control Variable Name 
 
Support for governing 
coalition PARTY 
 
Age AGE  
Gender SEX  
Income INCOME  
 
 We can begin our analysis by looking at the relationship between satisfaction with 
regional government and support for further devolution. H1 predicts a positive correlation 
between these two variables, and Table 4.2 below suggests such a relationship. 
Table 4.2: Relationship between Support for Further Devolution and Satisfaction 
 Satisfaction with regional government  
 1st Quartile 2nd Quartile 3rd Quartile 4th Quartile  
Support for 
further 
devolution (%) 
14.8 44.8 71.8 90.0 Total 
N 520 719 433 569 2241 
 
It is clear that a positive correlation exists between satisfaction and support for 
devolution. We can conduct a similar analysis with identity and support for further devolution. 
The results of Table 4.3 offer a different picture than the one predicted by H3, with identity 
positively correlated with support for devolution. 
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Table 4.3: Relationship between Support for Further Devolution and Identity 
 Identity  
 British not Welsh 
More British 
than Welsh 
Equally 
Welsh and 
British 
More Welsh 
than British 
Welsh not 
British  
Support for 
further 
devolution 
(%) 
32.0 48.2 52.7 76.4 80.3 Total 
N 525 274 789 471 427 2486 
 
Indeed, the trend in Table 4.3 largely mirrors the one found in Table 4.2, where a strong and 
positive correlation was found. 
 
The results of Table 4.3 and Graph 4.1 to challenge the prediction of H3 by suggesting 
that the relationship between identity and support for further devolution that is both positive and 
strong, but further analysis is required to accurately assess the impact. 
 To measure the explanatory power of the independent variables, we can run a binary 
logistic regression on support for devolution. The results of this regression are below. 
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Table 4.4: Binary Logistic Regression, all cases 
Variable B 
SATIS .581 (.083)*** 
TRUST .869 (.084)*** 
REPRN 1.465 (.146)*** 
IDENT .420 (.058)*** 
 
Control 
 
PARTY .109 (.152) 
AGE -.053 (.043) 
GENDER .200 (.147) 
INCOME .007 (.065) 
 
Constant -6.537 (.500)*** 
Nagelkerke R2 .610 
N 1605 
Standard error in parentheses. 
*Statistically significant at the 90% level. **Statistically 
significant at the 95% level. ***Statistically significant at 
the 99% level. 
 
 The regression analysis indicates that both policy and affective satisfaction with regional 
government have a positive and statistically significant impact on a respondent’s support for 
further devolution. This supports both H1 and H2. Identity also has a positive effect, as expected, 
but its high statistical significance suggests that identity still matters when determining voter 
support for further devolution, in contrast to H3. As an additional test of H3, we can look at 
whether identity matters to all respondents or just a subset of respondents. 
Table 4.5: Support for Further Devolution (%) by Identity and Satisfaction 
  Identity  
  British not Welsh 
More 
British 
than Welsh 
Equally 
Welsh and 
British 
More 
Welsh than 
British 
Welsh not 
British  
Satisfaction 
with 
regional 
government 
1st quartile 3.3 17.7 12.4 32.8 37.5 
Total 2
nd quartile 21.9 41.8 39.0 67.5 71.7 
3rd quartile 52.9 69.2 67.8 87.2 83.3 
4th quartile 81.3 76.3 90.3 93.2 94.9 
 N 431 223 682 390 362 2088 
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Table 4.5 attempts to isolate an interaction effect between satisfaction and identity, or 
that the effect of one variable is impacted by the level of the other variable. There is reason to 
believe that the effect of identity will diminish as the level of satisfaction increases, since the 
voter can use satisfaction as a reason to support further devolution rather than relying on non-
consequentialist reasoning such as identity. This would partly support H3 by suggesting that 
satisfaction does displace identity as a determinant of support for further devolution, but only at 
higher levels of satisfaction. However, as evidenced in Table 4.5 and also in Graph 4.2 below, it 
appears that identity has a similar effect on support for devolution at all levels of satisfaction. 
 
It is noteworthy in Graph 4.2 that the line is higher at each increasing level of 
satisfaction. Although the effect of identity may be constant, the power of identity may change. 
We will return to this in a moment. In the meantime, a regression analysis confirms the initial 
findings that an interaction effect between satisfaction and identity does not exist. 
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Table 4.6: Binary Logistic Regression, all cases 
Variable B 
SATIS .639 (.185)*** 
TRUST .867 (.084)*** 
REPRN 1.464 (.146)*** 
IDENT .469 (.150)*** 
SATIS*IDENT -.020 (.056) 
 
Control 
 
PARTY .110 (.152) 
AGE -.052 (.043) 
GENDER .199 (.147) 
INCOME .007 (.065) 
 
Constant -6.681 (.647)*** 
Nagelkerke R2 .610 
N 1605 
Standard error in parentheses. 
*Statistically significant at the 90% level. **Statistically 
significant at the 95% level. ***Statistically significant at 
the 99% level. 
 
 As previously noted, Graph 4.2 suggests that the power (coefficient) of identity decreases 
as satisfaction increases. If identity was the only determining factor of support for devolution, 
each of these lines would be identical, and voters of the same identity would show no difference 
despite variations in satisfaction. On the contrary, we see that at the same level of identity, 
greater satisfaction with regional government performance increases the likelihood that a voter 
will support further devolution. Put simply, the more satisfied a voter is, the more that voter 
considers satisfaction at the expense of identity. 
 We can test these findings empirically by examining the explanatory power of identity at 
each quartile of satisfaction. In Table 4.7 below, I regress support for further devolution on 
IDENT at each quartile of satisfaction. 
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Table 4.7: Results of Support for Further Devolution Regressed on Identity, by Satisfaction 
 Satisfaction with regional government 
 1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile 
Coefficient .632 .567 .432 .407 
Nagelkerke R2 .133 .152 .082 .058 
 
There are clear downward trends in both the coefficient, which represents the power of 
identity, and in the r-squared, which indicates the percentage of variation in support for 
devolution explained by identity. This suggests that as a voter’s satisfaction with regional 
government increases, the power of identity decreases and it is displaced by satisfaction. Identity 
still matters, but substantially less as satisfaction increases. 
 We can now examine the Welsh case in light of the hypotheses of this thesis. The most 
unambiguous result is that both relative trust and perceived representativeness of the regional 
government affect support for further devolution. In the first regression, both of these variables 
had statistically significant positive coefficients, indicating that as affective support for the 
Welsh government increases, so does support for further devolution, which supports H2. The 
coefficient for policy satisfaction was also positive and statistically significant in support of H1, 
but the implications of this were more nuanced. Although satisfaction was a determinant of voter 
support for devolution, the effect of identity was largely uniform at each quartile of satisfaction. 
This challenged H3 by suggesting that identity was not displaced by satisfaction, but more 
rigorous analysis revealed that as satisfaction increases, the power of identity as a determining 
factor does decrease. These results imply that H3 should be revised, such that the power of 
identity should decrease as satisfaction increases and voters are able to justify their support for 
further devolution on material utility. While this could still be considered the displacement of 
identity by satisfaction, the results suggest that identity still matters in voter decision-making at 
all levels of satisfaction. 
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V. Case Study - Catalonia 
  
Located in the northeast corner of Spain, Catalonia offers many of the same advantages 
as Wales as the second case study in this thesis. For more than a century, Catalan nationalists 
have struggled with the central government for regional autonomy, resulting in an uneven 
process of devolution that has stopped well short of independence. Moreover, the major 
nationalist parties have historically focused on achieving federalism, not independence, and 
recent conflicts between the Catalan government and the Spanish Parliament likely intensified 
public awareness of devolution issues. Indeed, the former First Minister of Wales, Rhodri 
Morgan, has suggested that Wales could learn from the experience of Catalonia (Morgan 2010). 
However, Catalonia also provides a more robust challenge to the hypotheses due to the powerful 
role of identity in Catalan politics. Due to the historical importance of Catalan identity, 
confirmation of the hypotheses in this case study should offer compelling support for the 
declining role of identity in voter decision-making about further devolution. 
 This section will be divided into four parts. First, I will briefly discuss the history of 
devolution in Catalonia and the role of identity in that process. Second, I will describe the data 
used in this case study, and third, I will use the data to test the hypotheses in this paper. Finally, I 
will discuss the results and their implications for this thesis. 
 Modern Catalan nationalism began around 1898, after Spain lost Cuba and the 
Philippines during the Spanish-American War. Catalan economic and intellectual elites lost 
confidence in the Spanish state and started developing a political identity to supplement Catalan 
cultural and linguistic identity (Wright 1999). After large-scale protests against the Spanish 
government in Barcelona, the head of Barcelona’s provincial council negotiated the creation of 
the Mancomunitat system. From 1913-23, the regional government was able to promote Catalan 
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history and language, including the establishment of a private school system with Catalan as the 
medium of instruction. In 1923, a coup d’état by fervent Spanish nationalist General Miguel 
Primo de Rivera led to the suppression of regional autonomy, including the banning of the 
Catalan language in public. The regime lasted only seven years, however, and on the day that the 
Second Republic was established in 1931, Catalan nationalists declared an independent Catalan 
Republic. This independent state was never realized, and subsequent negotiations with the 
Spanish government resulted in Catalonia’s first Statute of Autonomy. 
 At this time, “regionalism underwent a clear shift to the left” in response to the 
conservative dictatorship of Primo de Rivera (Schrijver 2006). This proved to be a liability for 
nationalists when the Second Republic fell to the dictatorship of General Francisco Franco in 
1939. The association of regionalism with socialism, along with Franco’s own fervent Spanish 
nationalism, led to a determined effort to eliminate regional identities in Spain. In Catalonia, 
regional leaders were killed and the public use of Catalan was prohibited. Instead of eradicating 
Catalan nationalism, however, these efforts strengthened regionalists’ desire for autonomy. As 
Keating (1998) writes, “The regime’s insistence on identifying Spanish national unity with itself 
only succeeded in delegitimizing both the state and the nation… all this was to help unite the 
anti-Franco resistance.” During the final days of the Franco regime, regionalist groups were 
among the primary forces of resistance (Schrijver 2006). 
 After the death of Franco in 1975, a new Constitution acknowledged the rights of 
national minorities in Spain; Article 2 “recognizes and guarantees the right to autonomy of all 
the nationalities and regions.” The Constitution established a process for decentralization known 
as café para todos (coffee for all), in which regions were invited to draft their own Statutes of 
Autonomy subject to Parliamentary approval. Three routes were established for decentralization. 
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The first route applied to the “historic nationalities” of Catalonia, Galacia, and the Basque 
Country, and required only a popular referendum. A second, expedited route was established for 
regions such as Andalusia that were not historic nationalities but had overwhelming support 
among both local governments and the population. A third process allowed local governments to 
consolidate into a region, with a Statute of Autonomy taking effect five years after a popular 
referendum. Through café para todos, every region of Spain was given the opportunity to seek 
autonomy, and all did so by 1983. 
 The devolved regions, known as Autonomous Communities, are granted substantial 
policymaking authority. The Generalitat de Catalunya (Government of Catalonia) makes laws 
concerning education, health, culture, housing, transportation, law enforcement, and agriculture. 
Except for the Basque Country and Navarre, which levy and collect their own taxes, regions 
receive payments from a special fund administered by the Spanish government that is intended to 
equalize resources among the regions. The Convergence and Union Party (CiU), the main 
nationalist party, “defines Catalonia as a ‘nation’ in its own right but does not challenge the 
overarching idea of Spanish unity” (Guibernau 2000). As a result, federalization rather than 
independence has been the primary goal of Catalan regionalists. In 2006, Catalonia revised its 
Statute of Autonomy to call itself a “nation,” which was opposed by the Spanish Parliament and 
found by the Spanish constitutional court to have no legal authority. More recently, the CiU 
President of the Generalitat, Artur Mas, has called for fiscal autonomy for Catalonia, including 
the devolution of taxation authority. 
Although polls of Catalan residents have been conducted around regional elections, the 
most comprehensive assessment of center-periphery attitudes in Spain is the Barómetro 
Autonómico (II) conducted in 2010 by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, a Spanish 
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government agency that regularly polls citizens on a variety of issues. The study included 903 
residents of Catalonia. Surveys were done by interviews in the home, and asked respondents 
about regional and national governance, devolution, identity, and political views. 
 Respondents were asked to state their preferred level of devolution, which was recoded 
into a binary variable named SUPDEV representing whether the voter supports further 
devolution.24 Unlike the Welsh case, outright independence was not presented as an option; 
instead, voters were able to select “A State which recognizes to the Autonomous Communities 
the possibility of becoming independent states.”25 
 Respondents were asked to describe the overall performance of the Catalan government 
since the previous election, a variable known as PERFORM. I expect that voters’ assessments of 
regional government performance will have a positive relationship with their support for further 
devolution. Respondents were also asked whether the Catalan government has demonstrated 
“knowledge of the problems of Catalonia,” a binary variable known as REPRN which measures 
the regional government’s perceived representativeness. I expect voters who believe the 
government is representative to be more likely to support further devolution. Although 
respondents were not asked about trust in government, they did rate the level of corruption in the 
Catalan government. Calling this variable TRUST, I expect that as perceived corruption 
decreases, a voter will be more likely to support further devolution.26  
 Identity was measured using a standard five-point Moreno scale, known as IDENT in the 
                                                
24 Similar to the Welsh case, an OLS regression using an ordinal scale of status quo, more devolution, and 
independence (ordered logit was again not possible) is presented in Appendix A. The only difference is that party 
becomes statistically significant. Respondents preferring either no devolution or less devolution made up around 
15% of the sample (including just 4.8% for less devolution), and like Wales, the decision to group them in this way 
corresponds with the political discourse in Catalonia. 
25 Full question texts from the Barómetro Autonómico (II) can be found in Appendix C. 
26 Because higher values of the variable represent less corruption, I expect the coefficient to be positive. 
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analysis.27 I expect that as respondents more strongly identify as Catalan, they will be more 
likely to support further devolution, but for this effect to be less predictive than measures of 
government performance, representativeness, and trust in line with H3. 
 Control variables include support for the governing coalition (PARTY)28, gender 
(GENDER), age (AGE), and socioeconomic status (CLASS). A summary of the variables and 
their expected relationship to SUPDEV is as follows below: 
Table 5.1: Summary of Variables and Expected Signs 
Variable Variable Name Expected Sign 
Satisfaction with regional 
government performance  PERFORM + 
Level of corruption in 
regional government TRUST + 
Regional government 
“knowledge of the 
problems of Catalonia” 
REPRN + 
Identity (Moreno scale) IDENT + 
 
Control Variable Name 
 
Support for governing 
coalition PARTY 
 
Gender GENDER  
Age AGE  
Socioeconomic Status CLASS  
 
 We can again look to some descriptive statistics as a preliminary test of the hypotheses. 
Satisfaction with regional government performance does not appear to be strongly correlated 
with support for further devolution. Table 5.2 presents the relationship between regional 
government performance and the dependent variable. 
 
                                                
27 The same possibility of endogeneity between satisfaction and identity exists as in the Welsh case. However, the 
Pearson’s correlation coefficients were once again very small (.023 for PERFORM, .031 for REPRN, and .025 for 
TRUST; none reached levels of statistical significance). 
28 Respondents were asked which party they voted for in the previous regional elections, which was considered their 
party affiliation. 
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Table 5.2: Relationship between Support for Further Devolution and Performance 
 Regional Government Performance  
 Very Bad Bad Regular Good Very Good  
Support for 
further 
devolution 
(%) 
56.8 56.3 55.8 56.6 50.0 Total 
N 44 176 471 143 2 836 
 
No clear trend between satisfaction with government performance and support for further 
devolution is present. This calls into question H1, but further analysis will be required. A similar 
test can be run for the relationship between identity and support for further devolution, and a 
much clearer trend appears: 
Table 5.3: Relationship between Support for Further Devolution and Identity 
 Identity  
 Spanish not Catalan 
More Spanish 
than Catalan 
Equally 
Spanish and 
Catalan 
More Catalan 
than Spanish 
Catalan not 
Spanish  
Support for 
further 
devolution 
(%) 
13.4 16.9 41.6 83.3 95.8 Total 
N 67 77 353 222 119 2486 
 
A positive correlation clearly exists between stronger Catalan identity and support for 
further devolution, which indicates that H3 may not hold in the Catalan case study. A binary 
logistic regression largely confirms these findings, and also casts doubt on H2 due to the low 
explanatory power of the variables measuring affective support for regional government. 
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Table 5.4: Binary Logistic Regression, all cases 
Variable B 
PERFORM -.076 (.136) 
TRUST .036 (.091) 
REPRN -.011 (.212) 
IDENT 1.433 (.133)*** 
 
Control 
 
PARTY .091 (.206) 
GENDER .035 (.195) 
AGE .017 (.065) 
CLASS -.106 (.071) 
 
Constant -4.001 (.666)*** 
Nagelkerke R2 .398 
N 631 
Standard error in parentheses. 
*Statistically significant at the 90% level. **Statistically 
significant at the 95% level. ***Statistically significant at 
the 99% level. 
 
 The regression analysis shows that both policy and affective satisfaction with regional 
government have no statistically significant relationship with support for further devolution. 
Moreover, both satisfaction with government performance and representativeness of the Catalan 
government have negative coefficients, indicating that as satisfaction in those areas increases, 
support for further devolution actually decreases. More importantly, the only statistically 
significant variable is identity, which has the expected positive relationship with the dependent 
variable. These results suggest that all three of the hypotheses are incorrect. 
 Although unlikely due to the lack of statistical significance of PERFORM, an additional 
test of H3 may be performed by seeing if an interaction effect exists between PERFORM and 
IDENT. The “very good” response to the PERFORM variable has been removed from this 
analysis due to the small number of respondents who selected this option. 
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Table 5.5: Support for Further Devolution (%) by Identity and Performance 
  Identity  
  Spanish not Catalan 
More 
Spanish 
than 
Catalan 
Equally 
Spanish 
and 
Catalan 
More 
Catalan 
than 
Spanish 
Catalan not 
Spanish  
Satisfaction 
with 
regional 
government 
Very Bad 0 0 46.7 100 100 
Total Bad 15.4 13.0 41.3 84.4 100 Regular 13.5 23.1 42.6 81.1 98.2 
Good 25.0 11.1 36.5 89.2 87.0 
 N 64 76 343 218 116 817 
 
 Table 5.5 suggests that an interaction effect may exist between PERFORM and IDENT at 
some levels of identity. Among those claiming sole Spanish identity, as satisfaction increases, 
support for regional government increases as well. However, among those claiming equal 
Spanish and Catalan identity and sole Catalan identity, the trend is negative as satisfaction 
increases. This indicates that at stronger Catalan identity, increasing satisfaction actually reduces 
support for further devolution. Graph 5.1 uses trend lines to assess these findings. 
Graph 5.1: Effect of Identity by Performance 
 
 The trend lines for each level of satisfaction are similar but not parallel, potentially 
indicating a weak interaction effect with identity. Another binary logistic regression confirms 
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this possibility, finding that a statistically significant interaction effect exists, but at the highest 
allowable level of error. 
Table 5.6: Binary Logistic Regression, all cases 
Variable B 
PERFORM .903 (.564) 
TRUST .046 (.091) 
REPRN -.008 (.213) 
IDENT 2.326 (.537)*** 
PERFORM*IDENT -.306 (.172)* 
 
Control 
 
PARTY .101 (.207) 
GENDER .061 (.196) 
AGE .019 (.066) 
CLASS -.107 (.071) 
 
Constant -6.893 (1.807)*** 
Nagelkerke R2 .402 
N 631 
Standard error in parentheses. 
*Statistically significant at the 90% level. **Statistically 
significant at the 95% level. ***Statistically significant at 
the 99% level. 
 
 A simple empirical test to confirm the interaction effect can be found in Table 5.7, in 
which I regress support for further devolution on identity at each level of satisfaction (again 
excluding “very good”). 
Table 5.7: Results of Support for Further Devolution Regressed on Identity, by Performance 
 Satisfaction with regional government 
 Very Bad Bad Regular Good 
Coefficient 19.814 1.688 1.399 1.351 
Nagelkerke R2 .794 .481 .356 .333 
 
As expected, both the explanatory power (coefficient) and the r-squared of identity 
decrease as satisfaction with regional government increases. Table 5.7 is a resounding statement 
in support of H3, particularly when combined with the statistically significant finding of an 
interaction effect in the regression. 
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 These results are somewhat mystifying. The initial analysis strongly challenged both H1 
and H2 by suggesting that measures of support for regional government are not significant 
predictors of support for further devolution and that the effects of performance and 
representativeness are negative, the opposite direction proposed by the hypotheses. A possible 
explanation may be that the main nationalist party in Catalonia, the Convergence and Union 
Party, has not publicly promoted further devolution in areas outside of fiscal matters.29 
Therefore, while voters may approve of the performance of the regional government, the public 
discourse has not encouraged voters to make the link between satisfaction and further devolution, 
which suggests that devolution politics may be actually driven from the top-down. 
 Although performance was not statistically significant on its own, the analysis did 
uncover an interaction effect between satisfaction with regional government and identity. As 
satisfaction increases, the explanatory power of identity declines, in line with the third 
hypothesis. This result must be assessed cautiously, however. Even at the highest level of 
satisfaction, the coefficient for identity remains very high and explains more than 33% of the 
variation in support for further devolution. This contrasts with Wales, where identity was 
significantly mitigated at the highest levels of satisfaction. This limited effect of performance, 
which was not picked up in the aggregate regression analysis, suggests that identity in Catalonia 
operates similar to Gutierrez-Romero’s (2010) findings in the 2007 Kenyan elections, in which 
economic factors weaken the role of identity but only minimally.  
 
                                                
29 Another possibility is that the least satisfied respondents hold their identity more strongly than those with other 
levels of satisfaction, causing a bias in the data. However, a binary logistic regression presented in Appendix A, in 
which those responding “very bad” or “very good” on government performance were removed, still found that 
identity was the only statistically significant predictor of voter positions. 
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VI. Conclusion 
  
Previous research on devolution has largely focused on the causes of initial devolution. 
Far less attention has been paid to the causes of further devolution, even though it may rival the 
former in importance. The incremental steps taken towards greater autonomy both legitimize the 
initial devolution decision and add permanency to the new state structure. Devolution is a 
dynamic process, and its political context can change dramatically following the initial vote for 
autonomy. Studies that examine further devolution must take these changes into account when 
searching for its underlying mechanisms, which this thesis seeks to do by examining one 
particular aspect of devolution: how voters decide whether to support further devolution. 
 The decision to support initial devolution differs fundamentally from the decision to 
support further devolution. Initial devolution is an experiment; the consequences are largely 
unknown, and voters must rely on the few factors that are available (such as identity) to make a 
decision on polling day. However, the value of these factors, or their expressive utility, will not 
reduce unemployment or improve education standards. Practical considerations are paramount in 
voters’ minds, and when voters can assess the material utility of major institutional change, they 
will do so. It seems reasonable, therefore, to ask whether voters engage in cost-benefit 
evaluations of further devolution. Put more simply, this thesis asks whether voter decisions about 
further devolution are the same as any other decision a voter would make, like choosing a 
candidate who promises the most benefits to her constituents. 
 The measures selected to represent the material utility of further devolution were of both 
a policy and affective nature. There was no reason to expect that these measures would operate 
differently in the model. Rather, this diverse set of measures maximized the number of possible 
factors uncovered in the analysis, and it was not necessary for each measure to be significant to 
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support the core argument of this paper. As long as one of the measures explained voter positions 
on further devolution, then the shifting context of devolution would be shown to affect center-
periphery politics. The results in the Wales case study provided strong support for this position. 
Both the policy and affective measures were shown to affect voter decisions, and material utility 
was clearly a consideration for voters in Wales. More importantly, however, the role of identity 
in Wales is changing. Rigorous analysis revealed that as a voter is more satisfied with the 
performance of the regional government – as their expected material utility from devolution 
increases – the less powerful identity becomes in voter decision-making. Indeed, among the most 
satisfied voters, identity explains a mere six percent of the variation in positions on further 
devolution. Scholars of devolution have held up identity as the premier explanatory factor of 
devolution for more than two decades, but in Wales, identity appears to be taking a backseat to 
material utility for voters. 
 The results in Catalonia were more mixed. The analysis supported only the identity 
displacement hypothesis, and even this evidence was weak. Among the most satisfied 
individuals, identity still explained more than a third of the variation in positions on devolution; 
in Catalonia, it seems, identity still reigns supreme. Naturally, this begs the question of what 
could explain the different results in Catalonia and Wales. The most compelling explanation 
seems to be the deeply divergent histories of the two regions – and the recognition that history 
affects the meaning of identity. If identities are imagined (Anderson 1991), then how events 
which develop and shape the community are perceived by its members will affect the symbolic 
meaning of that identity. For Catalans, the repression of regional identity under Franco increases 
the psychological value of expressing that identity, both publicly and in the voting booth. 
Displays of Catalan identity shield it from destruction and obsolescence, and the desire to protect 
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Catalan identity may outweigh even economic considerations. For Catalans, identity is politics, 
and has been since the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera in the 1920s. Given these conditions, it is 
less surprising that material utility has not yet displaced identity to any notable degree. Contrast 
this with Wales, where the development of Welsh identity has largely been stunted. Since the 
mid-1800s, when the industrial revolution caused massive demographic shifts in the region, 
Welsh identity has slowly lost its defining characteristics. The history, language, and culture of 
someone living in the Welsh-speaking, Welsh-identified north can differ significantly from 
someone living in the English-speaking, British-identified south (Balsom 1985). Wales lacks the 
well-developed national press that can create the “imagined community” envisioned by Benedict 
Anderson.30 Indeed, not until Saunders Lewis’ famous 1962 radio address The Fate of the 
Language did the notion of a threat to Welsh identity gain traction. When the expressive value of 
identity is low, material utility easily take precedence for voters. 
 That identity has varied meanings in different regions has important implications for this 
study. The results cannot be applied uniformly to other cases without considering the 
development of identity in that region. Scholars must understand what identity actually means to 
people, and only then can they assess its role in voter decision-making. Other limitations exist as 
well. This thesis looks at a fixed point in each of the case studies, while our previous discussion 
indicates that the meaning of identity changes over time. Examining the role of identity over time 
could offer insights into the how much the nature of identity affects its importance to voters. 
Future studies must also consider the accuracy of performance measures. Although the utmost 
effort was given to selecting data that reflected a true assessment of regional government 
performance, it is impossible to know whether those measures were as pure as hoped. Even 
controlling for potential biases, these measures may be picking up attitudes and beliefs that have 
                                                
30 See Williams (2011) for a discussion of the problems facing Welsh media. 
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little to do with material utility. At the same time, these biasing factors may have a significant 
independent role as well, and the opportunity exists to include other variables (such as economic 
disparities between region and state or Europeanization) identified as drivers of initial devolution 
in analyses of further devolution. 
 And yet, despite the limitations of this study, the analyses of both Catalonia and Wales 
found support for H3. This suggests that voters do assess decisions on initial and further 
devolution differently. In order to develop a comprehensive theory about further devolution, 
further work on this topic is required. The most obvious avenue for this research is to apply the 
analysis to other cases in Europe – a particularly attractive option given the forthcoming 
referendum on independence in Scotland, in which voters may fall back on expressive voting 
given the uncertain consequences of secession. More advanced research designs would include 
the development of panel data on identity and government performance, so that scholars can 
measure the mutual effects that identity and performance assessments have on each other. 
 It is imperative that scholars look more closely at further devolution. Changes in state 
structure should not be seen as singular events, but rather as iterative processes in which voters 
repeatedly assess their desire for devolution on an evolving set of standards. There is much to be 
learned from studies in this field, and as the political landscape of Europe becomes more 
regionalized, the academic and policy benefits of this research are wide reaching. This study is 
hopefully one piece towards realizing these possibilities.  
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Appendix A 
 
Table A.1: OLS Regression, scaled devolution preferences (Wales) 
Variable B 
SATIS .091 (.015)*** 
TRUST .153 (.013)*** 
REPRN .222 (.026)*** 
IDENT .109 (.010)*** 
 
Control 
 
PARTY .022 (.027) 
AGE -.015 (.007)** 
GENDER -.017 (.025) 
INCOME -.013 (.011) 
 
Constant -.467 (.078)*** 
N 1605 
Standard error in parentheses. 
*Statistically significant at the 90% level. **Statistically 
significant at the 95% level. ***Statistically significant at 
the 99% level. 
 
 
 
Table A.2: OLS Regression, scaled devolution preferences (Catalonia) 
Variable B 
PERFORM -.043 (.158) 
TRUST .009 (.024) 
REPRN -.026 (.057) 
IDENT .445 (.025)*** 
 
Control 
 
PARTY .127 (.054)** 
GENDER -.030 (.052) 
AGE .006 (.017) 
CLASS -.023 (.019) 
 
Constant -.516 (.158)*** 
N 903 
Standard error in parentheses. 
*Statistically significant at the 90% level. **Statistically 
significant at the 95% level. ***Statistically significant at 
the 99% level. 
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Table A.3: Binary Logistic Regression, extreme satisfaction responses removed (Catalonia) 
Variable B 
PERFORM -.141 (.166) 
TRUST .084 (.094) 
REPRN .061 (.216) 
IDENT 1.372 (.134)*** 
 
Control 
 
PARTY .113 (.209) 
GENDER .097 (.198) 
AGE .000 (.067) 
CLASS -.098 (.073) 
 
Constant -3.918 (.636)*** 
N 903 
Standard error in parentheses. 
*Statistically significant at the 90% level. **Statistically 
significant at the 95% level. ***Statistically significant at 
the 99% level. 
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Appendix B 
 
The following table lists the variables used in the Welsh case study and the 2011 Welsh Referendum Study question 
from which they were derived. All options are listed according to their recoded values, not as originally presented in 
the survey, unless otherwise noted. 
 
Variable 2011 WRS Question 
SUPDEV 
Support for further devolution 
Which of these statements (about devolution) comes 
closest to your view? 
 
(1) There should be no devolved government in Wales 
(2) The National Assembly for Wales should have fewer 
powers 
(3) We should leave things as they are now 
(4) The National Assembly for Wales should have more 
powers 
(5) Wales should become independent, separate from the 
UK 
 
Options 1-3 were coded as 0, and options 4-5 were 
coded as 1. 
SATIS 
Factor analysis of HEALTH, 
EDUC, and LIVING 
HEALTH 
Assessment of NHS 
Do you think having a National Assembly for Wales has 
 
(1) Led to a decline in NHS standards in Wales 
(2) Neither – it has made no difference 
(3) Led to an improvement in NHS standards in Wales 
EDUC 
Assessment of education 
Do you think having a National Assembly for Wales has 
 
(1) Led to a decline in education standards in Wales 
(2) Neither – it has made no difference 
(3) Led to an improvement in education standards in 
Wales 
LIVING 
Assessment of living standards 
Do you think having a National Assembly for Wales has 
 
(1) Led to a decline in living standards in Wales 
(2) Neither – it has made no difference 
(3) Led to an improvement in living standards in Wales 
TRUST 
Relative measure of trust 
[WALES_TRUST – UK_TRUST] 
UK_TRUST 
Trust of UK politicians 
How much do you trust [the UK government/the Welsh 
Assembly Government] to work in Wales best interests? 
 
(1) Almost never 
(2) Only some of the time 
(3) Most of the time 
(4) Just about always 
WALES_TRUST 
Trust of Welsh politicians 
REPRN 
Representativeness of National Assembly for Wales 
Do you think having a National Assembly for Wales has 
 
(1) Given ordinary people less say in how Wales is 
governed 
(2) Neither – it has made no difference 
(3) Given ordinary people more say in how Wales is 
governed 
IDENT 
Moreno scale of Welsh/British identification 
Which, if any, of the following best describes how you 
see yourself? 
 
(1) British not Welsh 
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(2) More British than Welsh 
(3) Equally British and Welsh 
(4) More Welsh than British 
(5) Welsh not British 
PARTY 
Support for Labour/Plaid Cymru coalition government 
(0) Does not support governing coalition (supports other 
party) 
(1) Supports governing coalition 
AGE 
(1) 26 and below 
(2) 27-35 
(3) 36-44 
(4) 45-53 
(5) 54-62 
(6) 63-71 
(7) 72 and above 
INCOME (£) 
(1) 14,999 and below 
(2) 15,000 – 29,999 
(3) 30,000 – 44,999 
(4) 45,000 – 69,999 
(5) 70,000 and above 
GENDER (0) Male (1) Female 
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Appendix C 
 
The following table lists the variables used in the Catalan case study and the Barómetro Autonómico (II) question 
from which they were derived. All options are listed according to their recoded values, not as originally presented in 
the survey, unless otherwise noted. 
 
Variable Barómetro Autonómico (II) Question 
SUPDEV 
Support for further devolution 
Le voy a presentar ahora algunas fórmulas alternativas 
de organización territorial del Estado en España. 
Dígame, por favor, ¿con cuál está Ud. más de acuerdo? 
I am going to present to you now some alternative forms 
of territorial organization of the State in Spain. Tell me, 
please, with which of these do you most agree? 
 
(1) Un Estado con un único Gobierno Central sin 
autonomías 
A State with a Central Government without autonomies 
 
(2) Un Estado en el que las Comunidades Autónomas 
tengan menor autonomía que en la actualidad 
A State in which the Autonomous Communities have 
more autonomy than in the present 
 
(3) Un Estado con Comunidades Autónomas como en la 
actualidad 
A State with Autonomous Communities like in the 
present 
 
(4) Un Estado en el que las Comunidades Autónomas 
tenga mayor autonomía que en la actualidad 
A State in which the Autonomous Communities have 
more autonomy than in the present 
 
(5) Un Estado en que se reconociese a las Comunidades 
Autónomas la posibilidad de convertirse en estados 
independientes 
A State which recognizes to the Autonomous 
Communities the possibility of becoming independent 
states 
 
Options 1-3 were coded as 0, and options 4-5 were 
coded as 1. 
PERFORM 
Performance of regional government 
 
En términos generales, ¿cómo calificaría Ud. la gestión 
que ha realizado la Generalitat de Cataluña desde las 
últimas elecciones: muy buena, buena, regular, mala o 
muy mala? 
In general, how would you describe the administration 
that the Generalitat of Catalonia has conducted from the 
last elections? 
 
(1) Muy malo (Very bad) 
(2) Malo (Bad) 
(3) Regular 
(4) Bueno (Good) 
(5) Muy bueno (Very good) 
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REPRN 
Representativeness of regional government 
Ahora me gustaría que Ud. me dijera si, a su juicio, la 
actual Generalitat de Cataluña ha demostrado 
conocimiento de los problemas de Cataluña 
Now I would like you to tell me if, in your judgment, the 
actual Generalitat of Catalonia has demonstrated 
knowledge of the problems of Catalonia. 
 
(1) Sí (Yes) 
(2) No 
TRUST 
Level of corruption in Catalan politics 
¿Hasta qué punto cree Ud. que está extendida la 
corrupción en la política autonómica? 
Up to what point do you believe corruption extends in 
autonomous politics? 
 
(1) Muy extendida (Very widespread) 
(2) Bastante extendida (Rather widespread) 
(3) Algo extendida (Somewhat widespread)* 
(4) Poco extendida (A little widespread) 
(5) Nada extendida (Not widespread) 
 
* Not read to respondent 
IDENT 
Moreno scale of Catalan/Spanish identification 
¿Con cuál de las siguientes frases se identifica Ud. en 
mayor medida? 
With which of the following statements do you identify 
most? 
 
(1) Me siento únicamente español/a (I feel only Spanish) 
(2) Me siento más español/a que catalán/a (I feel more 
Spanish than Catalan) 
(3) Me siento tan español/a como catalán/a (I feel 
equally Spanish as Catalan) 
(4) Me siento más catalán/a que español/a (I feel more 
Catalan than Spanish) 
(5) Me siento únicamente catalán/a (I feel only Catalan) 
PARTY 
Support for coalition government 
(0) Does not support governing coalition (supports other 
party) 
(1) Supports governing coalition 
AGE 
(1) 28 and below 
(2) 29-39 
(3) 40-50 
(4) 51-61 
(5) 62-72 
(6) 73-84 
(7) 85 and above 
CLASS 
Socioeconomic status 
(1) Clase alta/media-alta (upper/middle-upper class) 
(2) Nuevas clases medias (new middle class) 
(3) Viejas clases medias (old middle class) 
(4) Obreros cualificados (qualified workers) 
(5) Obreros no cualificados (unqualified workers) 
GENDER (0) Male (1) Female 
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